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In almost every disaster situation, the use of standardized communication 
procedures among humanitarian relief agencies has been identified as one of the efficient 
practices to minimize the mismanagement of resources and thus to maximize the response 
effort among actors to reduce the incidence impact on the public and to increase their 
resilience capabilities. 
Agencies have access to several guidelines to follow during domestic disasters, but 
there have been very few manuals developed to guide relief organizations on best practices 
during international large and complex natural disasters such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake.   
Haiti has experienced over its history several years of natural disasters, political, social-
economic instability and recently has been devastated by one of the worst earthquakes that 
humanity has ever known.  
Methods and Findings 
After the 7.1 earthquakes on January 12, 2010, it was reported that over 10,000 
relief agencies, nonprofit organizations had deployed their staff for a short or a long term 
period to support the response and recovery effort. In order to explore the communication 
experiences and patterns of local and international agencies, a qualitative research study 
was administered, consisting of conducting semi-structured phone interviews with 
seventeen (17) respondents who participated in the complex humanitarian response in Haiti 
six years ago, using an eight question interview between February 4th and March 6th, 2016.  
Data and information captured through the interview process were used to document the 
communication process systematically, the strengths and limitations, the lessons learned 
 iv 
and recommendations provided by the respondents. Snowball sampling was used to 
identify and recruit participants who have traveled as emergency medical specialists or 
whose responsibilities helped with the coordination of the response.  Interviews were 
conducted in English or French and Haitian Creole depending on the participant’s linguistic 
preference and country of citizenship.  Interview transcripts, notes and codes were analyzed 
using key themes proposed as a framework for the study.   
Conclusion:  
Emergency response should not add more burden and responsibilities to 
government officials’ countries significantly affected by natural disasters and should not 
cause distress to the affected communities. Rapid response is thus needed but should be 
efficiently coordinated to avoid wasted supplies, untrained staff and an influx of 
inexperienced international agencies in a complex and resource limited environment. The 
absence of a national response plan, the lack leadership and guidance from the Haitian 
government have been perceived as a sign of weakness by almost all local and international 
relief agencies and the negative aftermath of the disaster has been exacerbated by the 
thousands of small organizations that came looking for visibility and ultimately 
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Agency: A division of government with a specific function offering a particular kind of 
assistance. In the Incident Command System, agencies are defined either as jurisdictional 
(having statutory responsibility for incident management) or as assisting or cooperating 
(providing resources or other assistance). Governmental organizations are most often in 
charge of an incident, though in certain circumstances private-sector organizations may be 
included. Additionally, nongovernmental organizations may be included to provide 
support. 
Communication: the existence of a standardized and organized method of information 
sharing in a multi agencies disaster response setting.      
Disaster: Any emergency event, including natural disasters (earthquakes, tornadoes, 
hurricanes), accidents (train wrecks, plane crashes, fires), terrorist attacks, pandemic, or 
other emergencies (school shooting, arson, community violence). 
Emergency: Any incident, whether natural or manmade, that requires responsive action to 
protect life or property. Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act, an emergency means any occasion or instance for which, in the 
determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local 
efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, 
or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States. 
Hazard: Something that is potentially dangerous or harmful, often the root cause of an 
unwanted outcome. 
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Incident: An occurrence or event, natural or manmade, that requires a response to protect 
life or property. Incidents can, for example, include major disasters, emergencies, terrorist 
attacks, terrorist threats, civil unrest, wildland and urban fires, floods, hazardous materials 
spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical 
storms, tsunamis, war-related disasters, public health and medical emergencies, and other 
occurrences requiring an emergency response. 
Incident Command System (ICS): A standardized on-scene emergency management 
construct specifically designed to provide for the adoption of an integrated organizational 
structure that reflects the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents, without 
being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. ICS is a management system designed to 
enable effective incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, 
equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common 
organizational structure, designed to aid in the management of resources during incidents. 
Long-Term Recovery: A process of recovery that may continue for a number of months 
or years, depending on the severity and extent of the damage sustained. For example, long-
term recovery may include the complete redevelopment of damaged areas 
Non-governmental Organization (NGO): An entity with an association that is based on 
interests of its members, individuals, or institutions. It is not created by a government, but 
it may work cooperatively with government. Such organizations serve a public purpose, 
not a private benefit. Examples of NGOs include faith-based charity organizations and the 
American Red Cross. NGOs, including voluntary and faith-based groups, provide relief 
services to sustain life, reduce physical and emotional distress, and promote the recovery 
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of disaster victims. Often these groups provide specialized services that help individuals 
with disabilities. NGOs and voluntary organizations play a major role in assisting 
emergency managers before, during, and after an emergency. 
Major Disaster: Any natural catastrophe including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high 
water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, 
mudslide, snowstorm, or drought or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion that 
causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance, 
to require supplement efforts and resources of other countries, States, local governments, 
and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering 
caused thereby. 
Preparedness: Actions that involve a combination of planning, resources, training, 
exercising, and organizing to build, sustain, and improve operational capabilities. 
Preparedness is the process of identifying the personnel, training, and equipment needed 
for a wide range of potential incidents, and developing jurisdiction-specific plans for 
delivering capabilities when needed for an incident. 
Private Sector: Organizations and entities that are not part of any governmental structure. 
The private sector includes for-profit and not-for-profit organizations, formal and informal 
structures, commerce, and industry. 
Protocol: A set of established guidelines for actions (which may be designated by 
individuals, teams, functions, or capabilities) under various specified conditions 
Recovery: The development, coordination, and execution of service- and site-restoration 
plans; the reconstitution of government operations and services; individual, private-sector, 
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nongovernmental, and public-assistance programs to provide housing and to promote 
restoration; long-term care and treatment of affected persons; additional measures for 
social, political, environmental, and economic restoration; evaluation of the incident to 
identify lessons learned; post incident reporting; and development of initiatives to mitigate 
the effects of future incidents. 
Response: Immediate actions to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet 
basic human needs. Response also includes the execution of emergency plans and actions 
to support short-term recovery. 
Strategy: The general plan or direction selected to accomplish incident objectives 
Survivor: An individual of any age or gender, with different cultural, religious, or ethnic 
background who has been affected by a disaster, including disaster responders. 
Volunteer: Any individual accepted to perform services by the lead agency (which has 
authority to accept volunteer services) when the individual performs services without 
promise, expectation, or receipt of compensation for services performed. See 16 U.S.C. 
742f(c) and 29 CFR 553.101.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background 
The island of Hispaniola, located in the Caribbean Sea, is the second largest island 
in the Caribbean and is known around the world for its great cultural diversity, for its rich 
historical experiences and its colonial heritage. The kindness, the resilience and the charm 
of the two nations that share the same Island, Haiti on the West and the Dominican 
Republic the East side, largely explain the attraction of other nations to visit and discover 
the story of the citizens, their battles and their spiritual beliefs, particularly in Haiti. The 
mixture of customs and manners found in Haiti is a result of the various ethnic groups, 
native Indian, French, Hispanic, English, and African, who previously occupied the 
territories of Haiti.  











Source: Google Map Resources 
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The diverse and strong background of Haiti, as the first Black independent republic, 
serves as a model and fighting against several other nations to gain its freedom, partly 
explains the motivation, the determination and the continuous support that developed 
countries are expressing toward the needs of the Haitian people and in regards to the 
multiple socio-economic challenges that Haiti has experienced for several decades.  It is 
clear that many of the countries involved expressed the same willingness to support a 
sustainable development for this nation. The tumultuous and volatile political atmosphere 
that has been recorded in the early stage of Haiti’s independence generated social and 
political unrest that unfortunately delayed the creation of specialized infrastructures and 
contributed to the gradual decline of the country's resources.  
The exponential growth of the population recorded in the last twenty years has since 
worsened the situation. The most recent estimate of Haiti’s population in 2015 by the 
Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics (IHSI) was approximately 10,911,819 with 
40% of the total population residing in the Capital Port-au-Prince (IHSI, 2015). Between 
2000 and 2010, Haiti experienced a population increase of 17.6% (IHSI, 2015) escalating 
the population density to 384 (people per sq. km) for a surface area of 27, 750 sq.km in 
2013 according to the World Bank (World Bank, 2015). 
While the precariousness of life associated with low social-economic conditions 
and the fewer job opportunities of the vast majority of the population are a great concern, 
annual atmospheric changes weather deteriorations recorded over the past years, added to 
the serious El Nino effect in the Caribbean region, represent a major threat to the fragile 
environment of Haiti and further increase occurrence of disasters and public health 
emergencies every year (U.N. News Center, 2015). The United Nations through its food 
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security program has estimated that over three million people were at risk of food insecurity 
in 2015 (U.N. News Center, 2015). Protracted instability of the country and the relentless 
struggle for a prosperous economy left Haiti with several intellectual deficits, a weak health 
care system, and many low development indicators. It was estimated in 2013 that the 
literacy level of the entire population was 61.0%, the crude birth rate to be 25% in urban 
areas and 30% in rural regions of Haiti (IHSI, 2015), and the low life expectancy at birth 
to be 65 years for the whole country in 2013 (World Bank, 2015).  
The high diversity in religious practices is considered a sacred legacy of Haiti’s 
ancestors. The practices are predominantly represented by Catholicism with 55%, the 
Protestant groups (22%), Voodooist groups (20%) and others (3%) (IHSI, 2013).  
The Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in Haiti was estimated to be $820 
(Currency U.S.) in 2014 as compared to $6,030 in the Dominican Republic, the neighbor 
country, (World Bank, 2015). Only 54, 5% of the population ages 15 years and over were 
actively engaged in the economic growth of the country according to Haiti’s 2010 census 
(IHSI, 2015).  
                                                                      Figure 2: Haiti’s Fault-line Quake 
 Haiti’s long-term history of 
natural disasters is directly linked to its 
geographic location. First, the 
Hispaniola Island is located on the 
trajectory of major hurricanes belt 
formed annually in the Atlantic Ocean, 
and second, based on the probabilistic seismic hazard maps proposed to study the 
Caribbean region, it is clear that the island is located in a complex seismic zone between 
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the North American and the Caribbean tectonic plates (Cox et al., 2011). Previous studies 
have identified three major fault lines in Haiti, including the Enriquillo, Septentrional, and 
Matheux Neiba lines that are continuously monitored to predict and calculate risk for the 
next major earthquake in the North American and Caribbean region (Cox et al., 2011). 
From 1600 to date, several hundred earthquakes with variances in frequency and 
magnitude have been recorded on each side of the island; more frequent in the East but 
more destructive on the West side. Eight of them have been reported as the deadliest ones, 
destroying cities and causing elevated death tolls in Haiti (Cox et al., 2011). Haiti’s soil 
and topography have been continuously studied. The U.S. Geological Survey in 
collaboration with the recently implemented Technical Unit of Seismology and Energy 
(UTSE) of Haiti are constantly monitoring seismologic movements and their magnitude on 
the island. The most recent 4.5 tremor was recorded on January 2, 2014 in Northern Haiti 
(Lambert, 2016). With the anticipated events recorded over time, a summary table of the 
major earthquakes in the Hispaniola Island and the destruction they have caused is 
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Table 1: List of Major earthquakes recorded in Haiti 
 
Dates Major destructions types and Cities 
1564 during Spanish 
colonization 
Entire destruction of two cities : Concepción de la Vega and 
 Santiago de los Caballeros. 
November 9, 1701 The Tiburon Peninsula from Leogane to Petit Goave sink  
into sea 
November 21 & 22, 
1751 
The recently built city of Port-au-Prince was completely 
destroyed by a 6.9 magnitude earthquake 
June 3, 1770 Extended destruction of three communes Croix de Bouquets, 
Plain of the Cul-de-Sac to Port-au-Prince and along the north 
coast of the Tiburon Peninsula as far as Miragôane and Grand-
Gôave was submerged by the elevated sea. 
1783 Collapse of several edifices and destruction of major 
infrastructure in Santiago 
May 7, 1842 Complete Destruction of Cap-Haitian in the North and half of the 
population died. Elevation of the sea to 60 meters in Port-de-
Paix. Complete damage of the national Palace Sans-Souci and 
the monument la Citadelle Laferrière. Population was 10,000 
thus 5,000 deaths. 
August 4,1946 8.0 Earthquake in the Dominican Republic shook Haiti severely, 
killed 1,600 people and produced a tsunami  
January 12, 2010 7.3 earthquake in Port-au-Prince, Haiti and surrounding town, 
killed more than 150,000 people, injured 300,000 individuals, 
leaving 1.5 million displaced residents and over $8.5 billion U.S. 
in damage.  
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Haiti’s geographic proximity to the American countries, just 600 miles off the coast 
of Florida, has played an important factor in maintaining the diplomatic, economic and 
political stability in the region. The types of collaborations offered and support received 
have in fact largely contributed to several responses and recovery efforts in Haiti after all 
these disasters. It is also important to relate the fact that the population of Haiti more than 
tripled since the 1952 earthquake (3.2 million) preceding the 2010 one (9.8 million) (U.S. 
Census, 2015). With the impact of globalization generally observed in urban cities, people 
are more vulnerable and often exposed to major public health emergencies and disasters 
(Kapur & Smith, 2011). The two largest urban cities in Haiti, Cap-Haitien and Port-au-
Prince, are considered as the most vulnerable regions in the country not only because of 
their population density but also because of their geographic proximity to two actives 
tectonic plates (Prepetit, 2015). The national seismologist, Prepetit, has warned the Haitian 
government of an imminent disaster in the North if a preparedness plan was not 
implemented as soon as possible to prevent a death toll similar to one registered in 2010 
(Prepetit, 2011).    
Since the establishment of democracy in Haiti in 1987, the bilateral relationship 
between Haiti and the United Stated has been reinforced to guaranty the safety of the region 
(prevention of drug transactions and gun control) and to strategically develop business 
opportunities for both countries. Additionally, the expansion of large Haitian communities 
over the past twenty-five (25) years in several U.S. states has significantly impacted Haiti 
socially and economically (Orozco, 2006).  It was estimated in 2006, that over two million 
Haitians lived in the United Stated (Buss & Gardner, 2005). Haiti’s collaboration with 
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partner countries has been officially acknowledged through signatures of conventions. 
Haiti is a recognized United Nations member, an active participant in the Caribbean 
Community and Common Market (CARICOM) in addition to numerous official treaties 
and other international alliances. Through these collaboration structures, Haiti received 
ongoing relief efforts and aid every year during and after hurricane seasons. 
When the 2010 earthquake struck, President Obama immediately convened an 
urgent meeting with the heads of the U.S. Foreign agencies to coordinate a rapid response 
to this disaster. It was followed by a Senate hearing on January 28 to explicitly discuss the 
great needs of the country from the Rescue to Recovery and Reconstruction phase 
(Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010). The international communities pledged a total of 
$13.34 billion in U.S. aid to Haiti for the response and recovery effort for ten years from 
2010 to 2020 (CNN Library, 2015). As of September 2014, it was reported that $6.43 
billion would have been disbursed for just the response phase through the channel of 
multilateral and bilateral agencies, another $3 billion from private donations for the 
technical assistance of NGOs and UN agencies and a sum of $3.1 billion of aid committed 
to Haiti by the U.S. Government (CNN Library, 2015). 
Prior to 2010, several infrastructures in Haiti were already facing insufficient 
numbers of qualified professionals, suitable equipment, appropriate guidelines and rules, 
and enough financial and intellectual resources needed to perform the daily responsibilities 
for the whole country. For example, the vulnerability of the population’s health status was 
a result of an unstructured health care system, lack of leadership and resources due to the 
political and economic instability that the country has endured for over two decades (Kemp 
& Rasbridge, 2004). The high morbidity and mortality rates observed during natural 
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disasters in Haiti are the results of insufficient primary health care services in the entire 
country, the recurrence of seasonal hurricanes worsening the infectious disease outbreaks, 
and the deficiency in specialized medical practices. Following the hurricanes of 2008, Haiti 
was classified “the most unstable of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) member 
countries” by Luis Moreno, IDP president, based on its high vulnerability to economic 
shocks and natural disasters (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010). 
According to the Haiti government, the devastating earthquake severely damaged 
or destroyed approximately 30,000 buildings including government offices, the national 
palace, the parliament building, almost all the ministry offices, schools, hospitals and 
businesses (Renois, 2010). The year that preceded the earthquake, with the reinforcement 
of security, the development of the touristic industry and with the trade agreements initiated 
with other countries, people in Haiti were starting to feel hope in a better life and future in 
Haiti (Hornbeck, 2010). The day after the deadly tremor in 2010, although Haiti was still 
experiencing the aftershocks, there was a massive migration to North American territories, 
the Dominican Republic, the Caribbean Islands and even the European countries due to the 
uncertainties and hopeless conditions that survivors were experiencing. On the fifth year 
of the earthquake commemoration, the U.S. Government Immigration and Naturalization 
Services (INS) approved the applications of 58,000 Haitians who moved to the U.S. after 
January 10, for the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program which is an immigration 
program for Haiti’s humanitarian response (Young & Hubson, 2015). The exact number of 
Haitians who relocated in other countries is not known; but it possible that those who left 
had either a relative, an acquaintance abroad, held a US visitor visa or a permanent 
residency status which reduced their chance to being return to the country. The rate of 
  9 
immigrants from Haiti to other developed countries mainly the United States remained 
significantly high until 1990 after the installation of the first democratic government in 
1990 (Kemp & Rasbridge, 2004). But the migration movement re-emerged after 2010 
when a substantial number of skilled adults and young adolescents who fled the country to 
care for their siblings or families had not only impacted the country socially, economically 
but Haiti’s recovery was far more difficult without sufficient educated and competent 
Haitian professionals (Patrick, 2011). 
 
Statement of the Problem: 
The unpredictable nature of natural disasters, especially earthquakes, in addition to the 
massive destructions that are usually registered, have always been a challenging situation 
for country governments and populations in general (Kapur & Smith, 2011). Many 
disasters have marked the human life by the impacts they have made or the drastic changes 
they have provoked in the environment. The following definition of disaster – “A natural 
or man-made tragedy that adversely affects society or the environment” (Smith, 2011) is 
the simplest way to describe the incriminating roles of both human and nature in the course 
of disasters.  In all aspects of disasters, it is important to understand that the resiliency 
capacity of the environment and the affected communities will play an important role in 
the survival mode, the quick recovery of social life and the return to normal life. The 
various disasters experienced in the 21st century confirmed the need for an additional effort 
of coordination and communication to improve the response outcomes, especially across 
multiagency interventions (Kapur & Smith, 2011). Communication is a basic function in 
all the levels of disaster preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery and is crucial in 
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public health emergency management (Kapur & Smith, 2011). It has been proven that 
effective communication management is a critical tool in the management of a disaster 
(Marlow & Wilson, 1997). Previous research has underlined the two major causes 
responsible for organizational failure during disaster relief effort, these include:  
a) Significant misconduct and negligence of agencies’ personnel to use safe and 
effective method of communication during their duties; 
b) And the lack of total control over the information channels that often generate 
confusion, miscommunication, and distractions among them and other stakeholders 
(Abarquez & Murshed, 2004).  Communication is therefore a powerful, dynamic 
and complex process that nurtures common goals and objectives practices, positive 
attitudes and leadership, empowerment and information sharing practices among 
first responders, decision makers and stakeholders during disasters (Skinner 
&Rampersad, 2014). 
 
Significance of study 
Because of its geographic location, Haiti is three times more at risk for natural 
disasters than any other country in the Caribbean. Besides, Haiti has suffered from massive 
deforestation practices since the end of the colonial time causing an aggressive erosion of 
the soil in the mountainous regions, recurrent flooding scenarios in the coastal cities and 
mudslides in several rural villages. It is estimated that 65% of the domestic energy 
production in private residences in Haiti comes from the use of wood charcoal aggravating 
the deforestation of Haiti’s biggest eco-systems (McClintock, 2003). In addition, the 
construction industry largely relies on the use of woods which has drastically altered the 
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landscape and increased the vulnerability of the country to hurricanes (McClintock, 2003). 
When the hurricane season is announced from April through November, people in Haiti, 
particularly farmers and agricultural laborers, usually fear that their farms, plantations and 
gardens will be ruined by strong winds, heavy rains, and deluges often experienced in the 
past. The socio-economic situation of these groups of the population worsens day by day 
and are forced to migrate to urban cities to make a living (McClintock, 2003). Furthermore, 
the temporary relocation of several thousands of people from the coastal regions of Haiti 
due to meteorological conditions adds to migration phenomenon.  In 2012, just two years 
after the earthquake, two super storms severely smashed Haiti. The tropical storm Isaac in 
August followed by the super storm Sandy in October both accounted for 54 deaths, the 
relocation of 19,000 families, 39,000 homeless and over 90, 000 hectares of crops 
destroyed; the losses were estimated at more than $25 million dollars (USAID, 2013). 
Although the country’s natural resources were depleted and the deterioration of the 
environment was more evident every year, local government agencies have not contributed 
sufficiently to disaster preparedness programs. Very few prevention plans exist to educate 
the communities about disasters. If a U.S. model of National Response Framework (NFR) 
existed in Haiti, it was not published or known by local stakeholders. Crisis communication 
plans, which constitute the foundation for situational awareness were not well disseminated 
or known by local agencies involved in disaster responses. The promotion of partnership 
and collaboration among local private organizations and public entities to design and 
implement preparedness programs have not been initiated. Five years after the 
commemoration of the 2010 earthquake, the efforts to develop emergency preparedness 
and response plans remained minimal in the country. There is slight indication that a more 
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robust communication channel exists now to share action plans and set goals among local 
agencies. To date, crisis communication plans and disaster awareness programs are still 
not well perceived by the vast majority of the populations residing in vulnerable regions of 
Haiti. In all the situations mentioned above, inappropriate prevention and mitigation 
programs, insufficient and ineffective communication strategies to inform communities of 
existing dangers in a timely fashion have been observed.    
Literature Review  
Through the developmental course of the emergency preparedness and response 
program in the U.S., several scholars have studied and published findings and 
recommendations on information sharing practices and need for strong collaboration and 
coordination among agencies when responding to disasters. Protocols and guidelines were 
published using the experiences and expertise of State and Federal agencies that have been 
involved in disaster responses in the past decades. The Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), The Centers for Control Disease and Prevention (CDC), the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) and thousands of other faith-based, Humanitarian 
Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have largely contributed to the 
creation of a rich and diverse inventory of policies, tools, plans, guidelines, frameworks, 
that can be adapted and used in case of a disaster in the U.S. Based on the past disaster 
experiences, U.S. agencies understood the need to create Crisis and Emergency Risk 
Communication (CERC) models that would be standard, but could be adapted for the use 
in several circumstances, conditions, and at different levels of magnitude before, during 
and after the disaster would occur (Palttala et al., 2012). Among the biggest achievements 
in terms of disaster preparedness and response plans, it is important to highlight the 
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National Response Framework (NFR) which was created and implemented in 1992 after 
Hurricane Andrew devastated several cities in the South and the East coast of the U.S., and 
the National Response Plan (NRP) created in 2004 following the September 11 terrorist 
attacks (Kapur & Smith, 2011). These two reference documents are complimentary, 
although each presents a different set of goals. The role of the NRF during a disaster is to 
regulate the operations at the State, Federal and Local level and assure that interventions 
are well coordinated among agencies, and partners; only when resources at the local and 
State levels are disbursed and additional capacities are needed, the State of emergency will 
be declared by the president for the release of Federal funds and assistance (Kapur & Smith, 
2011). The NRP provides directions and baselines to all State, Federal and local 
stakeholders for the use of mutual operation plans and strategies during the planning, 
response, recovery, and mitigation of disasters.  
Unfortunately, in regards to emergency management guidelines and regulations, fewer 
publications and documentation exist or have been published to help understand what 
resources have been created in developing countries. The Interim Haiti Recovery 
Commission (IHRC) was the only multi-agency cluster created three months after the 
earthquake to manage the reconstruction funds and implement strategic planning and 
coordination among bilateral, multilateral agencies, NGOs and the local businesses in Haiti 
(Haiti Live, 2010). This commission was mainly composed of international donors (13 
members) and executive representatives of the government (8 members) (Haiti Live, 2010). 
While Haiti is a Creole and French speaking country, the meetings sessions were always 
held in English which represented a major barrier for the few non-governmental Haitian 
representatives (4 members). It is also true that communication is the number one problem 
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in all disaster relief, and it is compounded if language barriers are a factor. Therefore, the 
liability and transparency of the IHRC with the recovery funds have been questioned 
several times (Chery, 2014). There is little evidence that the IHRC emergency response 
and recovery plans have been transitioned to the government in place. As observed in 
disasters previously experienced around the world, one of the common challenges in the 
aftermath of incidents is the capacity of relief agencies to use effective communication 
strategies to mitigate threats to communities and themselves. The assumption is that 
communication issues would be of utmost importance when humanitarian agencies deploy 
their emergency managers and first responders in a developing country where resources, 
the first language and the information sharing practices are different.  
In Haiti, for example, the Civil Protection Department (Direction de la Protection 
Civile, DPC) is under the central direction of the Ministry of Interior created in 1984, has 
as its primary responsibility to perform risk assessment and disaster management 
throughout the territory of Haiti (DPC, 2013). Prior to this date, the Haitian Red Cross was 
the only legal organization officially assigned to respond to disasters in Haiti from 1932 to 
1984. The DCP is the governmental agency/entity empowered by the President to provide 
the following services: inform and coordinate preventive measures, train first responders, 
coordinate disaster management at the national and regional level, and provide responses 
to disasters, supervise the regional emergency response offices, request and manage the 
disaster resources (DCP, 2013). This office collaborates with the United Nations and U.S. 
agencies including United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) for the reinforcement of their structure 
and competencies (DCP, 2013). Although the lead agency for disaster management of Haiti 
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is very proactive and collaborates with international donors and relief agencies to prevent 
and mitigate for disasters in Haiti, the guidelines or protocols used in 2010 was not 
available on the official website of the Direction de la Protection Civile (DCP, 2015). That 
does not mean that these documents do not exist or are not distributed among other partners, 
but that they have not been identified.  
As stated by Heather Meeds in the context of the Hurricane Katrina in 2006, “to truly 
understand the consequences of the lack of communications, it is important to understand 
the role of communications in complex equations” (Meeds, 2006).  Hurricane Katrina and 
the attack on the World Trade Center have been listed among the most devastating disasters 
in the United States. In both events, it has been proven that communication issues were one 
of the major problems associated with the response. 
Meeds also explains that communications involve “information transfer and includes 
the use of the technology associated with the representation, transfer, interpretation, and 
processing of data among persons, places, and machines. It includes transmission, 
emission, or reception of signs, signals, writing, images, and sounds or intelligence of any 
nature by wire, radio, optical, or other electromagnetic systems” (Meeds, 2006). This 
detailed definition of communication focuses on the use of electronics and technology as 
the adopted mean of communication during a crisis that when delayed or interrupted, can 
cause problems.  Regardless of the preparedness level, failure to manage communication 
quickly and efficiently during a disaster, will undermine the mission of a first responder. 
Communication means more than having a technology system to support the transfer of 
messages; it does not only rely on social media to identify the medical needs or the need 
for assistance in a specific region. It also means being able to share effective information 
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using a standardized protocol and a simple language to communicate necessary and vital 
instructions to others, including emergency managers, planners, and responders; effective 
communication is the most important skill and tool to acquire and master in emergency 
management (FEMA, 2015). 
 The use of technology services and social networks is gradually becoming an 
acceptable and reliable method of communication to report needs and emergencies during 
an incident.  The new trends now are first and foremost the use and reliance on digital 
networks to report information when a natural and manmade disaster is experienced. For 
example, the digital humanitarian response in Haiti was described as an unprecedented 
experience and was very well used to help with the relief effort in Haiti (Meier, 2015). 
Although the reliability and confidentiality of messages shared by social media are 
often questionable, several strengths have been identified with the use of these new 
information platforms and sophisticated technology (Kapur & Smith, 2011).  The last two 
major disasters, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Haiti’s earthquake demonstrated that with 
the existed information systems, data sharing and humanitarian responses were facilitated 
by identifying and locating where the urgent assistance was needed (Kapur & Smith, 2011). 
 The need for a rapid transmission of information among first responders, and the great 
capacity to support emergency operations with the satellite support is effective when these 
telecommunication towers, source of energy and landlines are not disrupted (Kapur & 
Smith, 2011). Several platforms have been developed to assist specifically with regional 
disasters and humanitarian relief effort including: OpenStreetMap (OSM), Digital 
Humanitarian Network (DHN), Geo Clicker, MicroMappers, DigitalGlobe (DG), Ushahidi 
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and more (Meier, 2015).  For example, in Haiti, several social media applications were 
used and were the only method of communication to locate victims, request support for 
shelter, food and medical assistance but there are several other components that were 
needed to trust a source of information and skilled translation personnel required at all 
times to decrypt and translate the text messages which caused delays to use of information 
shared (Meier, 2015). In summary, whatever the type or form of communication used or 
available, a strong coordination among partners and a control of communication networks 
is required to ensure reliability in the transmission and the use of the information shared.  
The emergency communication process in general requires coordination not only at 
various levels of the hierarchy within the organization but also among the members of the 
larger response organization network (Palttala et al., 2012). Communication needs to be a 
regular part of crisis management procedures, and decision-making during a crisis calls for 
openness (Visuri, 2003). Previous studies have demonstrated that the absence of standard 
communication protocols and the lack of coordinated actions in a multi-agency response 
effort during a disaster will escalate the disastrous effects on both the country and also on 
the entire community (Dawes et al. 2004; Skinner & Rampersad, 2014; Helsloot, 2005). 
Several researches studied emergency relief agencies experiences during the Haiti’s 2010 
disaster response. Among them, an interesting case study that examined partnership 
between public agencies and non-profit relief organizations during the 2010 Haiti’s 
earthquake provided evidence that “communication, trust, and experience are the most 
important partnership inputs; the most prevalent governance structure of public–nonprofit 
partnerships are a lead organization network” (Nolte & Boenigk, 2011). Specifically, in the 
complex situation of Haiti in 2010, with over forty-four Foreign Field Hospitals (FFH) 
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deployed in less than a month, initiating a collaboration and partnership approach was not 
an easy task (Gerdin et al., 2013). Compared to other major disastrous events experienced 
in other region, the number of FFH in Haiti were greater than other places but none of them 
complied to the WHO/PAHO requirements as requested (Gerdin et al., 2013). As related 
in a study on FFHs in Haiti in 2010, the positive impact of the medical emergency 
assistantship was difficult to determine due to insufficient data and lack of transparency of 
the relief agencies (Gerdin et al., 2013). 
This study examined organizations communication practices, methods and protocols 
used among agencies and learn from the experiences of local and international first 
responders, emergency managers who participated in the 2010 Haiti disaster response and 
recovery. 
The Purpose of this study:  The purpose of this study was to examine communication 
experiences of disaster relief agencies personnel using standard methodologies during the 
Haiti 2010 Earthquake response phase.  It aimed to collect crucial information from key 
informants during an interview process and to generate a body of essential set of 
information reflecting the challenges experienced and the lessons learned by relief agencies 
during the Haiti 2010 disaster.    
Research questions: For this research paper, an examination of first responders’ disasters’ 
experiences will be performed in order to answer the following questions:  
1)    What were the communication experiences of local and international first responders 
during the Haiti’s 2010 disaster response? 
 How was the information shared between players on the ground?  
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 What communication protocols and procedures existed and were used? 
2)    How were the international agencies’ disaster response structures adapted to the Haiti 
disaster?   
3) What are the similarities and the differences identified in the communication 
protocols/channels used by the local government organization and the international 
agencies during and after the response phase?  
These research questions have helped elucidate the communication methods used 
by relief organizations during the complex emergency response and confirm if they may 
have also contributed to the amplified misconducts of the local and international agencies 
during the post-earthquake crisis in Haiti. 
These questions highlighted communication experiences of first responders and 
understand what worked or did not work well in Haiti with a focus on the methods of 
communications, the use of standardized communication guidelines and protocols, and the 
role of local and international first responders in identifying communication hurdles during 
the response mission in Haiti. Through an interview process with selected local and 
international agency representatives who collaborated from far or traveled to work in Haiti, 
the following three areas were explored:  1) understand the communication protocols and 
strategies adopted to share information between international agencies and a) local 
communities, b) private or public organizations,  c) Haiti governmental agencies; 2)  
identify if a standardized communication channel existed among international agencies to 
communicate their action plan; 3) finally to understand if a communication framework 
existed in Haiti during the disaster response for local government agencies to communicate 
with first responders, and how that framework was used and by whom. Examples of 
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information sharing methods and crisis communication strategies in Haiti were not found 
in the literature review.  
The current study aimed to help further the research and the knowledge on the 
existing communication limitations in Haiti. Several information sharing models have been 
proposed by developed countries that had used their experiences, resources and evidence 
based strategies to develop a robust disaster preparedness, response and recovery plan.  
A U.S. information sharing model is presented below to show the operation system 
and coordination mechanism needed for a strong response (Kapur & Smith, 2011). 

















B) National Operation 
Center 
C) Federal Agencies 
NRCC/ FBI/ 
NCTC/NMCC 
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This diagram explains the activation and deployment process based on the U.S. 
model. Each segment of the circle represents a level of leadership, operation and 
coordination. As described in the National Incidence Management System (NIMS), a 
common operation system is indicated and is essential in the general management of the 
response. Each level will progressively invest and use their resources, capacities and 
strategies before reaching out to a higher level (Kapur & Smith, 2011). 
A) The local and State Operation Centers are first actives in the event of a disaster. Tribal 
and Local emergency agency responders will be first deployed and work in collaboration 
with the community based organizations. Resources at the State level will be used when 
local and tribal resources and capacities are not sufficient.   
B) National Operation Center (NOC) acts as the reporting hub for and is responsible of the 
intelligence management of information for the State operation centers. 
C) Federal Agencies: Federal resources are used upon the declaration of State of 
emergency and take over relief activities once State level is no longer capable of responding 
to the disaster. These includes a coordination action among federal agencies (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, National Military Command Center, National Counterterrorism 
Center, Federal Emergency Management Agency). 
D) Response Implementation with Framework: The unified Command System plays a key 
role in assuring a common operation of actions and a common organization and 
management of activities.  This circular pattern emergency management system promotes 
a continuous and dynamic linkage among actors involved in the response at various levels 
while allowing the self-sufficiency of each segment. A comparison of the Haitian national 
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information shared during activation process is shown below. This Haiti intervention 
system model was retrieved from the draft document of the official national risk and 
disaster management framework published in 2001:   
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Source : Système National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres : Plan national 
d’intervention, République d’Haïti, 2001 
The longitudinal pattern of the information sharing model in Haiti, compared to the 
circular information transfer process in the U.S. as presented above, could potentially 
explain the communication bottlenecks in regards to the disaster response in 2010. 
According to the Haitian national risk and disaster management, the following scheme 
provides a framework for structuring national actions to be taken in response to a disaster 
or an emergency. It describes the mechanisms and the organization of which the Haitian 
government will mobilize resources and will request for assistance following a disaster or 
emergency exceeding the capacity of local authorities.  
The coordination of actions mostly relies on the following committees (units) to 
execute a response:   
A.   National Committee of Risk and Disaster Management (SNGRD); 
      A1. Advisory Committee of civil society; 
      A2. Support Group for International Cooperation (CAMI); 
B.   Permanent Secretariat of Risk and Disaster Management (SPGRD); 
      B1. Institutional / sectoral thematic committees (for risk management); 
      B2. Emergency Operations Center (for disaster management); 
C.   Departmental Committees; 
D.   Communal (District) and local committees.  
In a case of disaster, the actions for the response are initiated under the guidance of 
the entities of the group A; A1 and A2 are used as financial leverage. The requests are then 
directed to B group committees for the execution of orders after evaluation of available 
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resources. Groups C and D assure the implementation of the response based on the 
allocated resources and guidance of B group. 
 
II. REASERCH METHODOLOGY 
Research Design and Questions 
A phenomenology research designed was proposed for this study in order to 
examine the live experiences reported by first responders in the aftermath of the Haiti 2010 
earthquake. The methodology consisted of a phone-based interview with first responders 
who participated in Haiti’s disaster response. The interviews were conducted with a 
selected number of participants of Haitian local and international agencies who had 
participated in either the response or recovery phases of the disaster relief effort in Haiti 
six years ago. Eight open-ended questions were used to conduct the interview. A second 
validation interview was performed with a small number of participants to reduce recall 
bias (10%). A list of organizations was created. The selected participants were contacted 
via email and invited to participate in the research project. Prior their participation, all 
essential information was shared with participants including the research purpose, 
objectives and questions. A confidentiality section was proposed in the following section 
to address all concerns and questions pertaining security and confidentiality measures.   
Individual interview was conducted through phone calls. The eight proposed 
questions were regrouped into five different themes and domains as shown below. 
Additional sub questions were also asked during interviews.  
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1) Theme 1: Disaster experience and Perception of Communication 
 Can you explain what was your contribution in Haiti in 2010?   
 How would you describe your communication experience as a first responder 
during the disaster response in Haiti? 
2) Theme 2: Existence and use of communication protocols 
 Can you elaborate on the preferred method of communication used by your 
organization during the 2010 disaster response in Haiti?  
3) Theme 3: Collaboration among organizations 
 Were you aware of communication procedure different than your agency that was 
adopted by another organization to share information while collaborating with 
stakeholders in Haiti? 
 While collaborating on the disaster response in Haiti, what national communication 
plan was proposed by the Haitian government to share information with relief 
organizations?  
4) Theme 4: Challenges and Lessons learned 
 Can you briefly explain the strengths and limitations of your agency during the 
experienced in communicating decisions with others? 
 What are your lessons learned from your communication experience during your 
humanitarian mission in Haiti?  
5) Theme 5: Recommendations/ Perspective/ Next steps 
 What would be your recommendations to improve the communication protocols 
and strategies for an effective information sharing in Haiti in case of another 
disaster? 
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In addition to the question list above, a guide is also proposed in the appendix section 
to help guide the interview process and to help monitor the time, the possibly probes and 
other pertinent information needed.  “Appendix B: Interview questions and guide”. Each 
phone interview will be recorded. A paid, secured and licensed application “Tape A Call 
Pro” will be used to record each interview. This application was tested and is upgraded for 
a better performance. A free version of the Tape a Call was previously tested and was very 
satisfying. This application is often used by other professionals for investigations, 
interviews and other related works.   
Population  
Up to twenty (20) people were invited to participate in the interview. A total of 
seventeen (17) interviewees participated in the study after being informed of the 
confidentiality measures and following the revision of the consent form. Two strategies 
were used to select participants to be interviewed: first, key relief agencies were selected 
based on their relief scope of work in Haiti and longtime collaboration with the Haitian 
agencies; and second, participants were referred by key informants who were aware of their 
contribution in this disaster response. The heterogeneity of the group was considered 
according to their citizenship, the type of institution they worked for, their position and 
level of responsibilities during the Haiti’s response.  
Setting 
The interviews were conducted in the United States although several participants were 
located in Haiti, at the time of the interview. The selection of agency representatives varied 
by: personnel of non-governmental organizations, officials of the Haitian government, 
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Haitian non-profit governmental agencies, Haitian and U.S.  hospitals and community 
based agencies that have collaborated on a long term or short term response or recovery 
phase of the Haiti’s emergency and humanitarian relief effort in 2010.The selection of 
institutions was based on institution’s mission, their previous disaster relief experiences 
and scope of work. As stated, several selected organizations and their personnel were 
located in Haiti and therefore interviews were conducted in their location of origin. Below 
the list of relief agencies selected for this study:  
A) U.S. based organizations / institutions: 
a. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
b. The United Nations (UN) offices 
c. Massachusetts General Hospital/ DMAT team 
d. Haitian-American Coalition organization 
e. University of Miami (UM) 
f. The Project Medishare  
g. University of Nebraska Medical Center (UNMC) 
h. Urban Search & Rescue Task force 3 of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency(FEMA) 
i. The United Stated Agency for International Development (USAID) 
 
B) Haitian based organizations/ institutions:  
a. Haiti Ministry of Interior 
b. Partners in Health (PIH/ZL)  
c. Bureau of Protection Civil (DPC) / UNDP 
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d. Konbit Sante Organization 
e. Haiti Red Cross Office 
f. Haïti Air Ambulance (HAA) 
The investigator clearly informed participants of their right to withdraw from the 
process at any time before, during or after the interview. The option to respondents to call 
or email for additional information on a particular question was also offered to participants. 
Intervention   
Eight open-ended questions and several probes were used for the interview process. 
To reduce the fear of collaboration in the study, the safeguard of participants was 
guaranteed before, during and after the interview process. The recruitment of participants 
was directly coordinated with the selected candidate. An invitation email was sent directly 
to each expected subject (“Appendix A: Invitations letter”); there was no third party 
involved to reduce breach of confidentiality nor a job-related stress.  In addition, questions 
were created in such a way to avoid participants ‘opinion on agencies’ performance and to 
minimize disclosure of agencies’ internal procedures. Participants were also offered the 
option not to respond to an answer if not appropriate for them to do so.  
The open-ended questions provided richness and variety in responses by not being 
limited to one possible answer, produce differences in frequency distributions and ranking 
of the answers, produce of more invalid answers. Two Haitian public health personnel and 
two emergency preparedness classmates volunteered to help pre-test the questions for a 
week in order to support the reliability and face validity for the clarity of questions. Pre-
test phase was timed to better estimate the time needed to conduct the interview. Upon 
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feedback obtained, revisions were made on the questionnaire.  The respondents who 
participated in the interview received an email with the details of the interview including 
the date, time, and method of communication (phone number). All communication charges 
were handled by the investigator. The option to provide the questionnaire prior the 
interview was discussed with the respondent but the participants actually made the request. 
Interviews were conducted in French with the Haitian based organization and Creole and 
in English with the U.S. organizations and agencies. A French translated version of the 
questionnaire is attached in the appendix section “Appendix C: French and Creole 
interview questionnaire”. 
Ethical Considerations  
An interview form was created to collect information from key informants during 
the interview and an audio record will be obtained. An invitation email was sent to request 
confirmation of participation. An information sheet and consent form was also emailed to 
each participant to inform on the objectives of interview, the interview process and all 
confidentiality measures to protect their information “Appendix D: Information/ Consent 
form”. The exempt application for the International Review Board (IRB) of University of 
Nebraska Medical Center (UNMC) was submitted for clearance of data collection, use and 
the dissemination of results “Appendix E: Approved Consent letter”. Each participant was 
free to decline or to consent in participating in the interview, a consent form was provided 
prior the interview is initiated. Sensitive information like agency’s name, participants first 
and last name was coded to prevent any breach of confidentiality. A unique combination 
of letter and numbers was created for each participant. The code matched the audiotape 
recorded and the transcript as well.    
  30 
Example of coded data:  
Organization XXYY and Participant 1 was coded: XXYY1 followed by the month, 
date and year of interview (XXYY1010116). The first letter two letters (XX) replaced the 
two first letter of country if the participant is a Haitian local or a U.S. citizen followed by 
the organization’s name coded as two last letters (YY), the interviewee’s numbers (1) was 
attributed based on his/her order at the time of interview. First person was participant 1, 
last person was participant 17.    
Information collected, transcripts of interviews, recorded tapes participant’s 
information were stored in a safe place (encrypted hard drive). Security practices consisted 
of the use of a password to access all data and information gathered from this research by 
only one person for information verification and validation process.   
Data analysis Process:  
A deductive approach was used to regroup data collected and to look for similarities 
and differences among respondents’ information. The data collection process mostly 
consisted of capturing qualitative information during the interviews although quantitative 
data was also collected aggregated for the demographic information. The following 
diagram explains the key nine steps taken throughout the data collection, management and 
analysis processes to produce comprehensive tables to present the study results.    
1.  A matrix of subjects’ information was created to help manage the interviews process. 
2. Each coded audio record and coded transcript was added to the pocket file built for each 
subject which includes the Invitation letter sent to the subject, the consent notification 
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letter, any following message (reminder), interview transcript, interview audio record, 
subject’s information contact sheet. 
3. After each phone interview, raw data was reviewed, translated and saved.  
4. Primary level coding: This step implies a structural level coding of raw data within each 
transcript. Throughout the translation and revision process, notes were taking, memos were 
adding to paragraphs that were then labeled. A bulk of 20 coded labels were assigned using 
the interview guide as a reference document for the particular themes and domains that 
were listed. The standard codes include Knowledge of protocols, limitations, strengths, 
language barrier, experiences, national protocols, lessons learned, recommendations, 
improvement plans and efficiency, national plan, perspectives, duration, other procedures.  
5. Secondary level coding: This step helped identify pattern detected during the revision of 
all codes previously created, facilitated the analysis relationship between transcripts and 
permitted the harmonization of codes into key themes such as “Subjects’ experience in 
responding to disasters and their perception of the communication structure used in Haiti”; 
“Existing and use of local and international agencies’ internal and external communication 
protocols”; “Strategies of communication and collaboration within and between agencies”; 
“Strengths (challenges) and limitations of local and international agencies”; 
“Recommendations and perspectives of agencies to improve their communication 
structures and protocols”.  
6.  Nodes were created using N-vivo 11 and helped with the management of themes and 
subthemes by linking to the five domains of the study. 
7&8. Key themes are regrouped into domains and are linked to the study questions. 
9. Tables were prepared to display key study findings. 
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Type and Management of data: 
 Information that were collected include demographic data: Sex, number of year of 
experience, number of disaster relief experiences, former or current position in institution 
he/she worked for at the time of relief mission and key responsibilities during response and 
visit in Haiti. A matrix of codes was created. Information collected from the interview were 
be coded and aggregated. The utilization of the software “N-Vivo 11” (QSR International) 
was used to facilitate the collection, the sorting of information needed for the analysis. This 
choice of this software was justified by the fact that offers an easy method to organize 
materials by nodes, to regroup the selected themes using the coding and sorting option to 
track and regroup relevant information found in transcripts.  Interview transcripts, 
worksheet and audiotapes collected during interviews were saved and combined using 
attributes available in N-vivo 11 software to ease the management process.  
Below the Table 2. The qualitative data coding system template. 
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Structural Coding list (Level 1) Pattern Coding list (Level 2) Themes (Domains) Research Questions 
Gender 
 





Background Information of local and 
international relief agencies 
personnel and Previous experiences 
 
Key responsibilities of agencies and 
personnel during disaster response 
activities 
Local and international agencies’ 
personnel experiences and 
capabilities to respond to the 
Haiti earthquake (Disaster 
response experiences)  
1.What was the communication 
experiences of local and 
international first responders 





Example of application 
Knowledge and evidence of an 
existed national disaster response 
plan in Haiti 
 
Description of national response 
plan  
Existence and use of a national 
response protocols proposed by 
the Haitian Government to lead 
and facilitate coordination 
among local and international 
relief agencies 
1a.What national 
communication protocols and 





Other communication methods 
Internal Communication Plan 
Efficiency of internal 
communication 
External method of communication 
 
Collaboration within and 
between agencies 
1b.How was the information 
shared between actors on the 
ground? 





New protocols /Adapted 
protocols 
Same protocols 
Description of agencies’ structure 
on the ground 
 
Collaboration with local and 
international agencies 
Perception of Communication 
procedures reported by agencies’ 
staff based on their collaboration 
with relief agencies staff 
2.How international agencies 
disaster response structure was 
adapted to the Haiti disaster 












 Language Barrier 
Reported strengths and 
limitations (challenges) of Local 
and international agencies 
 
3.What are the similarities and 
the differences identified in the 
communication 
protocols/channels used by the 
local government agencies and 
the international responding 
agencies during and after the 
response phase? 
Local and international agencies’ 






The following result section describes the tables with the key findings as reported by 
the respondents. The result tables include:   
 Characteristics of participants (Table 3) 
 Structure of agencies and organizations (Table 4) 
 Agencies’ international and external communication protocols used by local and 
U.S. agencies in Haiti (Table 5) 
 Challenges, limitations and strengths reported by local and U.S agencies (Table 6) 
 Key lessons learned from the Haiti disaster reported by local and U.S. agencies 
(Table 7) 























Length of stay 
HAMI1 Male HA Haiti 
Government 
office  
Coordination of the 
response with the 
international agencies at the 
governance level 
6-10 yrs.  Yes, in Haiti N/A 
USCD2 Male US U.S. Federal 
Agency 
Responsible for activation 
and coordination the  EOC  
11-15 yrs. Yes, several N/A 
USKS3 Male US U.S. NGO based 
in Haiti 
Coordination of emergency 
response at the 
departmental level 
0 No 2 months 
USPM4 Male US US University 
Hospital 
 
Medical Services / first 
AID care to victims 
1-5yrs. Yes, 
domestically 
1st time:8 days 
2nd time: 10 
days 
USHA5 Male US US University 
Hospital 
Medical care / Mental 
health support.  
0 No 10 days 
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HAUS6 Male HA Federal Agency 
based in Haiti 
Health Coordinator/ 
Activation and monitoring 
of Emergency operation 
0 No N/A 
HAPI7 Male HA Haitian NGO 
with HQ in US 
Deputy medical director 1-5 yrs.  Yes, locally N/A 
USCD8 Male US U.S Federal 
Agency 






2 weeks  
USUN9 Female US U.S. University 
Hospital  
Medical Services / first 
AID care to victims 
0 No 6 days 
HAPC10 Female HA Haiti Civil 
Protection Unit   
National Emergency 
response coordinator/ 
Technical assistant for UN 
agency 





USMA11 Female US US Hospital/ 
DHHS DMAT 
team 
Deputy commander of 
DMAT 




1st time: 10 
days 
2nd time: 10 
days 
HACR12 Male HA Haitian Relief 
Agency 
President of the Agency   6-10 yrs.  Yes, locally  N/A 
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USFE13 Male US US Federal 
Agency 
Urban Search& Rescue 
team 





USMA14 Male US US hospital/ 
emergency 
medical director 
Remote coordination of 
medical emergency 
response team 
11-15 yrs. Yes, 
domestically 
N/A 
USHC15 Male US US NGO Primary coordinator for the 
relief effort 
0 No 15 days 
HAHA16 Male HA Haitian Private 
Organization  
Emergency Medical AID 
Surgery/ Transportation 
1-5yrs Yes, locally N/A 
USUN17 Male US US. University 
Hospital 
Intensive care/ First AID 
care to victims 
0 No 1st Time: 3 
weeks 
2nd Time: 3 
weeks 
Note: Length of stay was only asked from international agency’s representatives. It defines by the number of days, weeks or months 
spent in Haiti. US citizens who helped with the coordination of the response remotely will be listed N/A. For Haitian subjects, the answer 
is classified as non-applicable (N/A). Experience in years is categorized by 0, 1-5, 6-10, 11- 15, 16-20, 21-25, 26+ with no half year 
considered.  Position in Agency refers to the current of former position occupied by subject in 2010, the position in agency may be the 
same or different when deployed in Haiti. Note that Haitian subjects’ position in their related agency may be the same change during 
and after disaster response phase.  
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A total of seventeen (17) participants were interviewed from February to March, 2016 in 
order to collect information on their disaster response and coordination experiences in 2010 in 
Haiti. The overall response rate (RR) of the questions was 85%. The majority of respondents were 
male (N=14) compared to female (N=3). Participants’ key tasks and responsibilities varied 
according to their background and the agency they were working for at the time of the disaster 
response phase. Key responsibilities were categorized into three categories: Emergency operation 
management/ Disaster response coordination (N= 8), Medical care/ First Aid services/ Intensive 
care services (N=8) and Urban Search and Rescue (N=1).  
Almost all U.S. citizens traveled to Haiti within a period of three (3) days to 4 months of 
the disaster date, with the length of deployment not exceeding 3 weeks; which corresponds to the 
disaster response phase as specified by the State of emergency declaration of the Haitian 
government. The particular situation of Haiti after the January 12, 2010 is that the response phase 
was prolonged for over ten (10) months because of the Cholera outbreak that required ongoing 
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Figure 4: Number of Years of experience reported by first responders. 
 
As presented in the Figure 4. above, the majority of first responders who participated in 
the disaster response (35%) reported less than one year of experience in disaster response 
domestically and/ or internationally.  Two groups, 11 - 15 and 21- 25 years represented 18% of 
the subjects followed by a group of 1 -5 years (17%). It was reported by interviewed subjects that 
inexperienced agencies and relief personnel were problematic to work with particularly in such 
complex emergency response setting and austere environment. Subjects USMA14 reflected the 
difficulties in communicating with inexperienced and self-deployed individuals “It was reported 
that there were large number of different groups of relief agencies who were self-deployed and 
who were not trying to make contact with the Haitian Government and were providing care without 




Table 4. Agency Classification: 
Country Agency profile  Level  Structure Type 
Haiti Governmental ministry and 
affiliated offices (2) 
National  Public 
Non-Governmental Agency (2) Departmental  Mix/Private 
Humanitarian Relief Agency 
(1) 
National  Independent 
 
USA US Government Agency/ 
affiliated offices (2) 
Central Federal 
US Federal Agency (2) Regional Federal  
Non-Profit Organizations (2) Local  Mix/Private 
U.S. Hospitals (2) State State  
U.S. Universities (1) Local  State/ Private 




To facilitate the classification of the agencies involved in the response in Haiti, a 
classification of participants’ organizations or institutions was developed in three different 
structure types: 
1) The Haitian agencies include governmental ministries and their affiliated agencies (1); 
2) The Local Non-Governmental and the humanitarian relief agencies (4); 
 3) The U.S. entities are regrouped into central, regional and local agencies that were either 
governmentally, federally and state wide or privately funded (9).  
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Local and international Relief agencies’ internal and external communication plans 
Relief Agencies’ Internal Communication Plans 
Sixty-four percent (64.7 %) of the respondents (N=11) were able to respond to this 
section of the interview and provided information on the internal communication plan used 
by their agency during the deployment time in Haiti. They also highlighted their thoughts 
on the efficiency of this plan based on the experiences in Haiti and provided feedback on 
revisions or improvements that were made to these plans based on the response experience 
in Haiti.  As reported by most agencies’ staff, an autonomous internal communication plan 
existed within agencies and was the preferred method of communication used to share 
information with their personnel. The internal communication plan was specific to each 
agency/ organization to either communicate with the headquarters in the U.S. and with 
their U.S. deployed staff on the ground or within their staff usually based in satellite office 
in Haiti if the agency had such existed physical structure. To list the findings related to this 
section of the interview, participants were asked to elaborate on the preferred method of 
communication used by their agency during the 2010 disaster response in Haiti; to state if 
it was a new developed communication procedure or a pre-existed one and finally to 
provide their opinion on the efficiency of the communication procedure that was used.    
The summary table below presents the most relevant findings of agencies’ internal 
communication plan and examples of respondents’ answers based on questions asked and 








Key Findings Reported Participants Statements 
 
Haitian government  
and local agencies 
N=4 
 
 Limitation of the Haiti government to communicate 
with their Ministers; 
 
 No clear evidence if Haitian local organizations had 
a developed internal communication plan for their 
institutions in case of emergency; 
 International agencies communication plans were 
preferably adopted and used by Haitian local 
agencies; 
 
 Trained and experienced local relief agencies had 
little trouble using their pre-existing internal 
communication plan to activate their operations in 
Haiti and to request assistance from their 
headquarters.  
“It was extremely difficult because all government 
buildings/ministries were damaged. Humanitarian agencies' 
primary concern was to execute their plan without seeking to 
identify people in command in Haiti”. (HAMI1) 
“The most preferred methods of communication were mainly within 
agencies; each agency would be communicating with its own team 
and crew on the ground” (HAHA16). 
“Since we didn’t have a plan, we had to follow the DoD 
communication procedures because they knew better what to do in 
a complex humanitarian response” (HAUS6) 
“ Although our operation center was destroyed, we were able to 
activate the Operation Mechanism of Coordination to coordinate the 
response with the departmental offices but also to request assistance 
when we had overcome our local capacity to assist the victims” 
(HACR16) 
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U.S. Federal and 
international Agencies 
N= 7 
 Experienced U.S. Federal Agencies’ communication 
procedures were pretty standard to share information 
within their agencies 
 Adaptations were made to pre-existing 
communication procedures because of the context 
and the destroyed infrastructures in Haiti (Limited 
internet access, no satellite phones, Cellphone 
towers destroyed) 
 Small NGOs and Hospital Universities did not have 
a written communication plan but verbal instructions 
were given before landing in Haiti. 
 Communication procedures were quickly modified 
after relief agencies had reached Haiti because of the 
complexity of the disaster.  
“We have used the same communication and coordination protocols 
that we have used in previous disasters; although medical protocols 
were adapted” (USFE13) 
“We created something that was more adapted to the disaster 
context instead of jumping on the first plane and go to Haiti” 
(USHC15) 
 “I don’t recall receiving anything, there were verbal instructions. 
Security and safety instructions were verbally provided but nothing 
in written” (USUN9) 
“There was a plan but I think it probably changed very quickly and 
frequently because of the scale and the complexity of the disaster, 
surgical teams were put in use immediately” (USHA5). 
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With the exception of the Haiti Red Cross office, other agencies’ respondents 
admitted they didn’t have a process, but could describe what internal communication 
processes should have existed. The Red Cross had a detailed internal communication 
mechanism and emergency operations activation process. The Haitian agencies’ 
representative referred to this lack of internal communication procedures as a great concern 
and an urgent need for the government to address. It was highlighted that Haitian officials 
exclusively relied on the UN cluster system as an external communication platform to meet 
with the government ministers since almost all the government offices were destroyed. An 
experienced representative of the Haitian Government and technical assistant to the UN 
agencies in Haiti also expressed that the National Risk and Disaster Management Plan was 
not developed to assist with departmental disaster response but the DPC regional offices 
were not equipped or trained to support a disaster at a national level therefore 
communication plans were not prioritized for a complex emergency response situation “On 
n’avait jamais pensé que le niveau central serait autant atteint. Nous avions toujours eu à 
faire des préparations pour les niveaux départementaux mais pas le niveau 
central’’(HAPC10).    
Respondents were questioned on the efficiency of their agencies’ internal 
communication procedures. One Haitian local agency and eight U.S agencies’ staff 
responded to this question. Most U.S. relief agencies (72%; N=8) stated their satisfaction 
with the communication plan used and confirmed that it was efficiently used as opposed to 
the Haitian local agencies (16%). Among the nine responses collected for this section of 
the interview, five (5) agencies used a communication protocol that was previously 
established for their agency while four (4) agencies created a new procedure that would fit 
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this specific 2010 disaster context. During the interview, respondents were asked if they 
could share the National Response plan document; among those who agreed to share the 
plan, only one respondent shared two documents. The first is the conceptual operation plan 
for the risk and disaster management of the law enforcement system in Haiti entitled 
“Compléments d’Informations Pour la Planification Opérationnelle dans la Gestion des 
Risques et des Désastres de la Police Nationale d’Haïti (PNH)”; and the second one is 
the 2001 National Intervention Plan of the National risk and disaster management system 
“Plan National d’Intervention du Systeme National de Gestion des Rsiques et 
Desastres”.   
 
Relief agencies’ external communication operations 
All participants (100%; N=17) responded regarding their external communication 
procedures and experiences during their post-disaster response phase in Haiti. As reported, 
UN cluster meetings were mainly used as the platform for external communication between 
agencies. This section of the interview underlined the challenges experienced by most 
agencies’ representatives and helped elicit the limitations related to the complex emergency 
response context, to the existed infrastructures in Haiti and the multi-agencies involvement 
in the humanitarian assistantship.  
The information was captured by asking the participants to describe their 
communication experiences with other agencies during the disaster response in Haiti; to 
evaluate the communication ease or difficulties experienced with local or international 
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actors and finally if they were aware of communication procedure different than the one 
used by your agency while collaborating with stakeholders in Haiti.  
The summary table below presents the reported external communication 
experiences of most agencies’ involved in the disaster response phase in Haiti and 
examples of respondents’ answers based on questions asked and information collected 















 Most respondents described the first 4 weeks as a real 
“Chaos”  
 
 Centralized Meetings were convened and coordinated 
by the UN agencies (WHO/PAHO, UNDP, UNICEF, 
MINUSTAH); 
 
 The numbers of coordination meetings were extremely 
difficult to attend and the UN log base where the 
coordination meetings were convened was described as 
a “Babel Tour”; 
 
 Reported Conflicts among international relief agencies;  
 
 Reported frustration for the Haitian local relief agencies 
to communicate with international agencies 
specifically at the medical facilities;  
“It was clear that there was not an organized or planned 
communication structure. At first it was very difficult, it was a 
chaos. Only nine months after, we had been able to find a sort of 
coordination and communication mechanism between partners and 
yet it was very limited” (HAPI7) 
 
“The management of the emergency response on a broad 
perspective was not efficient. There was a lot of overlapping, 
competitions among agencies, a lot of “waste of time and 
resources” (HAHA16). 
 
“In addition to the centralized coordination meetings, there were 
so many other types of cluster reunions, coordination among the 
small agencies, health agencies, nutrition, water and sanitation, 
displaced population meetings” (HAPC10). 
 
“The U.S controlled the entry points in the country (Airport tour, 
national ports) prioritizing U.S. aircraft access to the country, 
which create conflicts with other countries” (HAMI1). 
 




 Limited coordination even among U.S. agencies 
 Too many different emergency response protocols were 
used. 
 Urban Search and Rescue teams lacking of 
professionalism  
 Absence of ethical principles of many international 
relief personnel and lack of respect of international 
disaster regulations  
 Absence of the Haitian Government leadership and 
authority to guide international relief agencies’ 
response plans.  
“It was difficult, everybody kind of became very independent, so 
WHO, the Israelis, DOD, DHHS, FDA, CDC everybody was 
rushing down to try to help but there was no overall coordination 
of who was responsible for what geographical areas, who was 
doing what to make things happen with a collective effort” 
(USCD8) 
“There was no communication between US and French search and 
rescue teams.” (USHA5) 
“There was also so many self-respond teams that were not 
coordinating with no body” (USMA14) 
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 In addition to the key findings highlighted in the summary Table 4. above in regards to the 
external communication strategies used by local and international relief agencies in Haiti to 
coordinate the needed relief effort and to respond in the complex emergency setting, respondents 
provided their opinion on the possible language barrier experienced through the coordination 
meetings. They also commented on other communication procedures that were observed while 
deployed in Haiti.  Seventy-six percent (76%) of the responses collected helped understand 
language barriers experienced by first responders. Only four (4) people reported difficulties 
communicating because of a different language used while five (5) did not recall any major 
problem and four (4) stated they experienced some limitations because of several languages used 
by several nations. Three specific conditions eased the communication process between 
international agencies and Haitian local actors. The first one was the presence of field office staff 
in Haiti. Several international agencies were more informed of the complexity of the disaster and 
the resources needed prior their trip because of the field office located in Haiti with Haitian staff 
on board handling the pre-assessment phase remotely. Respondent USCD2 stated “One thing that 
helped a lot was the existence of the CDC Haiti office that was opened in 2002”.  
 The second was the presence of French or Creole speaking personnel among rescuers 
traveling to Haiti “We were well prepared and had little language barrier because we had a group 
of Haitian helping with the cultural and language aspect” (USHA5). The third was the ability to 
identify and hire translators once they reached the Haitian territory “No, it was not a major 
challenge. That was one of the initial key. That is 100% what the local medical host group brought 
to us, they provided contact and information where to hire translator” (USMA11).   
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All the respondents recalled that several other communication procedures were used on the 
ground because of the large diversity of nations from around the world collaborating on the disaster 
response.  
Strengths and Limitations Reported by Agencies’ staff 
Nighty- four percent (94%; N=16) of the respondents provided answers to the strengths 
and limitations of the agencies during the complex emergency response experience in Haiti. 
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Table 7: Strengths and Limitations of U.S. and Haitian Local Agencies  
Strengths Key Findings 
US Agencies 
N = 11 
 Presence of an implemented field office implemented with local staff enabling communications with 
the local government officials and to facilitate logistic support during crisis; 
 Being able to change field offices’ mission and local staff’s from regular operations to relief centered 
operations; bringing the leadership and organizational skills; 
  Proximity to the disaster location: US relief agencies were able to deploy quickly than other nations; 
Sharing the same demographic characteristics, same language, same culture, knowledge of the 
environment (Statement from Florida first responders); 
 Establishment of pre-deployment connections with grassroots organizations, with the community to 
assess the needs of the population and locating where the resources were mostly needed;  
 Having a large international disaster specialized teams with medical specialty capabilities to operate in 




N = 6 
 Motivation and determination of Haitian medical staff to work above and beyond their capabilities with 
little resources;  
 Strong commitments toward the public in general (specifically for well know NGOs) 
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Limitations  Key Findings 
U.S. Agencies 
N = 16 
 No transportation, no logistic supports for the Urban Search & Rescue teams 
 Different marking system used; total chaos and confusion among international agencies 




N = 5 
 Weak Public Health Infrastructure in Haiti previously to the earthquake  
 Weak leadership of the Haitian Government even several months after the response phase  
 Political aspect of the humanitarian response in Haiti  
Common to 





 UN headquarter office was destroyed with several deaths  
 Mass casualties, large death toll, management of remains; risk of epidemics as potential treats  
 US and Haitian responders located in Haiti had to provide for their families while working as first 
responders; 
 Prolonged response phase (18 months or so) 
 No clear recovery plan and long term care facilities for the injured patients  
 No clear communication and disaster response plan  
 




 Strong and several years of collaboration with the Haitian government and the Ministry of Health 
 Trusted and reliable connections and collaborations between local and international agencies working 
in Haiti; 
 Large Haitian American physicians traveling to help 
 Large donations from all countries  
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Haitian organizations and U.S Agencies’ representatives provided important pieces 
of information relaying the identified strengths of their organizations during the response 
phase but also highlighted the limitations and challenges they faced during the deployment 
time in Haiti. According to the list of U.S. agencies’ strengths, it is important to emphasize 
the geographic proximity of Haiti to the United States, which had been instrumental in 
providing all types of emergency response assistantships in a short time. The urban search 
and rescue team task force 3 based in Florida was only one hour and a half away, and they 
deployed to Haiti within 48 hours after the disaster. The other strength was the ability to 
easily identify English speaking people in Haiti who volunteered to work with the first U.S. 
responders.  
In term of limitations, the most commonly reported ones are: the lack of 
transportations, the overlapping of services but in a disorganized fashion and the lack of 
leadership from the Haitian government. Agencies also presented common areas of 
strengths and limitations although almost all of them were related to the weak public health 
infrastructure that was predominant in Haiti prior the earthquake and the prolonged disaster 
relief timeline because of the subsequent cholera outbreak that was declared in Haiti just 
eight months after the earthquake.   
Perception of existing and use national communication / response plan – protocol: 
This section of the interview captured information related to the perception of an 
existing national emergency response plan proposed by the Haitian government. To the 
question “were you aware of a national emergency response plan that was proposed by the 
Haitian government to share information and coordinate the response with the relief 
organizations?”, 100% of the participating subjects (N=17) provided a response and one 
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U.S. agency representation do not answer this question.  Based on the information reported 
by three respondents to this question, key findings related to the design, operation and 
organization process and government leadership capacity are listed below.   
Tables 8. Existence and use of a National Emergency Response plan:   
Perception of and use of a 
National Disaster Response 
Plan proposed by the Haitian 
Government 
National Risk and Disaster Management Plan 
“Plan National de Gestion des Risques et Désastres”(PNGRD) 
Yes 
(19%; N=3) 
 Created in 1998, with the technical contribution of the UN 
agencies, the World Bank Organization and U.S. Federal 
Government (FEMA team consulting on the project).  
 It is called the National Risk and Disaster Management Plan 
 Partially used by the Division of the Civil Protection for small scale 
disasters at the regional level 
 Centralized activation mechanism 
 Implication of several local and international agencies for the 
operation  
 Bottom to top activation mechanism Vs Top to bottom process 
 Little implication of the Haitian government officials besides the 





Only three (3) Haitian local agency representatives confirmed the existence of a 
national plan although they also noted that the national risk and disaster management 
system was not well implemented, the risk communication and response plan was not well 
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disseminated nor well known by the Haitian President. As stated by an interviewed 
government technical assistant “Yes, there was a draft national response plan but the 
problem was mainly that until now the annexes (coordinating branches) have not been 
defined and identified. Therefore, the existing plan was not a functional one”. The 
respondent continues to add “The president and the prime minister didn't prioritize this 
plan. After the 2010 earthquake, the president created a mix commission to develop a 
response plan while there was one already created and available to use” (HAPC10). 
Almost all U.S. agencies’ representatives were not aware of any directives from the 
Haitian government to use a national emergency or a centralized communication plan. “I 
am not sure who had it, who knew about it, because it certainly didn’t seem to me that a 
certain plan had been followed” (USCD2). Other respondents clearly expressed the desire 
to receive guidance from the Haitian government to adapt their response plan “I 
participated in almost all the coordination meetings, I can’t say there was a national 
response plan in the initial phase, even when there was some sort of coordination plan that 
started weeks after it was difficult to confirm if the plan was from the Haitian government 
or from the UN because it was clearly demonstrated that the UN through the health clusters 
was in charge” (USMA11). And finally, another clearly stated that no plan had existed 
“No idea of the existence national response plan. At no moment during the various cluster 
meetings, a national response plan or communication coordination plan has been 
proposed, or even mentioned’’ (HAUS6). The overall response rate (RR) for this specific 
question was low (19%) when compared to the others questions for which the response rate 
is 65% or higher.     
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Lessons Learned and Recommendations of relief agencies 
All seventeen respondents (100%; N=17) provided feedbacks and 
recommendations on best practices related to complex emergency responses in the 
following areas: on national changes needed to improve emergency preparedness and 
response in Haiti; on international procedures; and protocols to adopt in regards to 
international disaster settings. Recommendations were first analyzed and categorized by 
groups of Haitian local agencies and U.S. agencies and then a subsequent group called 
“Mix Recommendations” was also created based on general opinions and suggestions that 
were common to both groups. Below is a summary table of most reported 
recommendations provided by respondents through the interview process.  
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Table 9. Experience-based recommendations and perspectives of U.S. and Local Based relief agencies. 
Agency’s 
Category 





 Be prepared for long disaster response phase mentally and 
physically 
 International First Responders must work with local 
agencies for logistic supports and guidance prior the 
departure; 
 Limited Air Control delays the response and the distribution 
of supplies (First responders arrived before medical cache)  
 Not enough specialized response team (pediatric, 
Disabilities) 
 Safety of the first response personnel, the danger is not what 
you think it could be (Epidemics/ Infectious disease) 
 
“The experience in Haiti, gave us an experience on how to 




“The huge take away message is to have someone 24/7 at 
the airport that is registering foreign medical teams and 
would share inform about where is need” (USMA11) 
 
 
“It seems that other international responders were less 
aggressive because they were scared on body fluid and the 





 Haiti Government should be more careful for what you ask 
for and how you request assistance  
“The federation has learned from this disaster experience 
that multiple representatives at the same time in a destroyed 
country without adequate logistic support and without a 
functional operation center is very challenging” (HACR12) 
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N=6  Learning to say “NO” to small Non-profit organizations and 
put restrictions if needed 
 Learning to mitigate and to prepare as opposed to develop 
only response capacities   




“I already knew that most of the new organizations would 
fight for more visibility so I was not surprised” (HAPC10) 
 
“In Haiti, for the past 20 years of experience, we do 90% 




Reported lessons learned from the 2010 Haiti earthquake experiences were presented 
by Haitian Local and U.S. agencies categories and were combined by most frequently 
reported lessons from all seventeen respondents to facilitate the comprehension of the 
findings. In addition to the lessons listed above, several U.S. first responders have 
recounted the following facts:  
1) The Haiti disaster was a good wakeup call and a strong demonstration of the 
problems with international disaster response not being sufficiently professional; 
2) The Haiti experienced helped many agencies with the disaster response in Nepal on 
April 2015; 
3) Also, the Haiti disaster served as a model for the Nepal government after the 2014 
earthquake to request the specific assistance needed in the early phase of the 
response;  
4) The UN cluster system was tested during Haiti’s earthquake for the first time, 
therefore it helped identify areas for improvement; 
5)  The 2010 earthquake in Haiti has opened doors for the social media as a potential 
avenue to reinforce ways of identification for assistance needs and humanitarian 
effort. Several people were located because they had access to a type of social 
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Recommendations from Disaster Response Relief Agencies. 
Recommendations were also collected during the interview and provided important 
information on what Haitian actors and U.S. first responders believed would be helpful in 
the near future in order to minimize the potential treats that Haiti is currently facing or will 
experience in the future if not well prepared; and also to better prepare for the future 
disasters that might impact the Caribbean region, more particularly the Hispaniola Island. 
As presented below, the recommendation section is divided into recommendations 
made:  
1)  At the national/ government level 
2) At the operational/ execution level 
3) At the community/ public level 
 




National/Governmental   Haiti should comply to the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) as proposed by the Global Health 
Security Agenda in 2003 (US) 
 Education for the government officials, the policy 
makers on disaster preparedness and response and create 
legislation for a legal organic structure to release relief 
funds and to activate operation mechanism (HA) 
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 The government should limit the number of relief 
agencies coming to the country in the first phase of 
response. 
1) Urban Search & Rescue Teams / EMS/ Shelter  
2) Food and Sanitation (clean water) / Disease Surveillance 
3) Rubble removal / Engineering / Continuity services 
(HA) 
Operations/ Execution  The UN mission for security and protection should 
change to become a humanitarian and rescue mission 
(US) 
 Regulation and control of the country’s airports and ports 
by government and closest partners involved in response 
(US) 
 Consolidation of all emergency response plan used in 
Haiti to create a one standardized model (HA) 
 Ensuring that safe air traffic is happening. Educate and 
include UN and WHO clusters in the national disaster 
medical response (US) 
Community/ 
Population based  
 Developing risk communication capabilities among 
communities (US/HA) 
 Decentralized emergency response plan and more 
leadership at the local level (US/HA); 
 Include protocols safety for women, children, disabled 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
This study explored the Haiti disaster relief effort from a different angle by offering 
the opportunity to investigate and analyze the experiences of two groups of agencies’ 
simultaneously which offers a more comprehensive approach to investigate the 
communication strengths and challenges experienced during and in the aftermath of the 
2010 earthquake in Haiti. Although other articles provided significant findings on Haiti’s 
earthquake humanitarian assistance and relief effort, their strategies were pretty distinct 
and less broad than this study (Babcock et al., 2012; Weisenfeld, 2011; Kreiss et al., 2010). 
The findings of this study are very much concordant with the results of other 
published articles, which have contemplated the chaotic state that prevailed in Haiti was 
due to an overly large presence of foreign agencies. Haiti, was described as the republic of 
NGOs because of the high number of nongovernmental organizations working in Port-au-
Prince the days following the 01/12 earthquake (Klarreich & Polman, 2012). This number 
was estimated to be over 10,000 (World Bank, 2009). The former UN special envoy after 
January 12, “Haiti has the second higher number of NGOs per capita in the world” (Bill 
Clinton, 2011). Similarly, to other findings, the perceived level of disorganization and 
miscommunication at the operational and leadership level identified in this study’s results 
had quickly overwhelmed the capacities and resources of most relief agencies leading to a 
little or almost no transition from an emergency response state handled by international 
organizations to an inefficient recovery phase managed by the local agencies (Leaning & 
Guha-Sapir, 2013). Auerbach et al. ,2010, had also identified many communication 
challenges in his investigations which can be compared to the findings of this study 
although his reported communication problems were addressed on a difference angle and 
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viewed on a different perspective by the author. In conclusion, the take home message is 
that “precise and reliable form of communication between relief agencies at the ground 
level could reduce chances of disagreement between aid workers and should be the lessons 
to apply to future disaster-response situations” (Auerbach et al., 2010). 
According the UN published assessment reports, in the aftermath of the 2010 
earthquake, Port-au-Prince had the largest presence of emergency response experts, 
working for the most experienced and equipped agencies in the field of disaster response 
(OCHA, 2012). Over 420 relief agencies were collaborating on the same ground for this 
common cause and brought the evidence of what the most urgent needs are in case of a 
disaster and   helped identify existing limitations related to international disasters 
(Karunakara, 2010). The presence of multi-disciplinary teams at once on the ground 
identified in this investigations were also reported as communication and coordination 
challenges.     
The following considerations should be entertained based on the responders 
describing the external communication between agencies:  
The particularity of the earthquake in 2010, besides the high number of deaths that it 
caused, mainly resides in the annihilation of the government structure itself which has been 
problematic in assuring the coordination of the disaster response plan (Karunakara, 2010). 
Referring to the U.S. communication sharing model or the national response system in 
Haiti, local leadership required to initiate coordination was lacking in a context of 
uncertainty but especially when considering the massive influx of relief actors operating in 
Haiti.  
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Therefore, the existence of a communication plan or its execution not prioritized 
when determining the minor role played by local actors that were quickly overwhelmed by 
the scale of the disaster and by not being involved in the inception phase of the response 
effort. A detailed analysis of the structural determinants of decision-making at the top level 
of governance during a crisis would have been interesting and would probably revealed 
additional elements in regards to the challenges in coordinating multitude stakeholders 
using different communication plans. The current study’s aimed to explore the experiences 
of first responders’ but didn’t emphasize on governance capabilities nor analyzed factors 
that could alter or delay the decision-making process.  
At the United Nations conference in New York in March 2010, it was proposed by 
the Prime Minister of Haiti that the first lesson of the 2010 EQ was to create a multinational 
alliance among local and international actors, based on the capacity of the United Nations 
cluster system, which could in the situation of complex emergencies assume a leadership 
role in the establishment of coordination mechanisms between the actors in the very first 
days.  
On the other hand, still within the context of the national response system, it is 
urgent to empower the decision making capacity at all level of the disaster response system 
including the local community level. That said the study did not look at how the Haitian 
resourcefulness allowed for concrete actions for the survival of people in the immediate 
post-earthquake. However, it is certain that core values of the Haitian people have greatly 
contributed to a self-coordination within communities mitigating the communication 
deficits experienced at the upper level which affected the effectiveness of emergency 
response. For example, Haitian communities were able develop resilience capabilities 
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within the very first weeks of the earthquake by restoring their daily operations and 
activities around the several IDP settlements implemented in Port-au-Prince. In this sense, 
it would also be recommended to look into more details at the communication means used 
for bidirectional communication between the central and the local level. 
The earthquake recently experienced in Nepal in 2015 is the first demonstration 
that lessons from Haiti’s complex humanitarian response can actually bring several 
recommendations to the world. Several recommendations deserve to be retained, ones more 
important than others; such as first, granting personal safety on the ground, securing 
efficient air and ground transportation methods, harmonizing central and regional 
coordination mechanisms and lastly, adopting standard global health initiatives that 
countries should adopt and adapt based on their specific environments and constraints. The 
former recommendations are specifically applicable to Haiti and U.S. agencies, but the 
latter is a more general recommendation that can be offered universally.  
Tragedies such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and the 7.8 earthquake in Nepal in 
2015 should direct the world to be more cautious and concerned about the ways emergency 
response resources are used during international relief efforts and should give the 
opportunity to develop stronger and more sustainable programs in these countries. Haiti’s 
disaster was a learning opportunity for all local and international relief agencies. Based on 
respondents’ experiences, the least experienced agencies' staff had gained significant 
knowledge and skills while the better established and well-known agencies found the 
opportunity to test and improve their capacities. No matter the angle considered in a 
disaster, there will always be valuable lessons to retain or to be learn.  
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Recommendations: 
Based on the study findings, the follow recommendations would help address 
communication in a major disaster setting and subsequently enhance coordination efforts. 
All of afore mentioned would lead to a better impact in terms of response for the benefits 
of the affected populations. In more details, Haitian local agencies’ representatives 
provided recommendations that are more policy and governmental oriented while U.S 
relief agencies’ recommendations were more oriented toward technical, approach of 
operations and International health regulations and standards of care.  It is unknown if all 
these recommendations have been shared with the Haitian Government or if an 
improvement has been initiated for the harmonization of all the government entities around 
the risks that Haiti faces everyday but it is almost certain that the Haitian communities are 
more aware of the treats and more enthusiastic to learn and to apply risk management and 
preparedness concepts that are recurrently disseminated by NGOs. 
 
Limitations of the Study:  
1) Geographic: The results of this study are not representative of the entire country. 
Over 500 000 people were displaced in other departments of Haiti. Several local 
and international relief agencies’ representatives who worked in other regions 
(department) of Haiti besides Port-au-Prince were not interviewed therefore their 
experienced challenges and strength could not be underlined in this report. It would 
be difficult to compare disaster response experiences between agencies working in 
the capital and those working in the other departments.  
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2) Sample: The challenges and strengths identified through the interviews are only 
the reflection of US and Haiti first responders and do not include the perceptions 
of other international relief agencies (Canadian, French, Russian, Israelis, 
Dominican Republic, Cuban and Caribbean organizations, etc.) 
3) Time: Qualitative research study can be time-consuming. Given the time 
constraints within which we conducted this qualitative study, it is safe to assume 
that it will benefit from additional quantitative investigative methods. Although we 
had quick response and approval by the IRB, the scheduling and conducting the 
interviews took longer than expected, particularly for the reasons articulated further 
below. To interview UN agency representatives, several approvals were needed 
which took a long time.   
4) Intervention: Phone interviews are often considered less suitable for qualitative 
studies since they are a less attractive method and can undermine the quality of 
information than the in person interview (Novick, 2008). It was more difficult to 
recruit Haitian Government authorities and the UN agencies when phone interview 
was proposed as the method of communication. In addition, phone numbers shared 
for communication were not always accurate because many agencies’ 
representatives have been promoted to new positions or have left the institution for 
which they had worked in 2010. Therefore, it was difficult to communicate with 
them since their emails and phone number have changed.  
5) Communication and Technology: Communication with Haiti was not easy; 
Although the "Tape a Call" system was tested prior to the interviews; it was not 
efficient to record conversations on prepaid card. Very few people in Haiti uses 
 
  73 
Skype for conference calls and when they do, their internet system is to slow to 
permit a 30 min telephone conversation, forcing the interview to alternate between 
different calling systems. 
 
Possible Bias of the study method:  
1) Temporal Effect: Time of this study, six years after the earthquake, several 
subjects reported not remembering all the details.  Recall bias is commonly 
identified in studies that require participants to use their memories to answer 
questions, especially if the event happened a long time ago.     
2) Reliability: Not having a second person to assist with the validation process (single 
reviewer bias). A qualitative research requires a second pair of eyes to examine the 
process and the findings. 
  
Strengths of the study: 
1) Language: Being able to conduct interviews in both languages English and French 
facilitated the conversation with the Haitian representatives who were more 
comfortable to be interviewed in French, sometimes Creole. 
2)  Topic: Communication is a crucial component of any emergency management or 
disaster response plan, and it was identified as being an important issue in the 
disaster response in Haiti in 2010.  
3) Response Rate: The targeted study population was 20 subjects, with a minimum 
of 12 subjects needed to justify the results; 17 subjects were interviewed 
(RR=85%). A diverse group of agencies was selected: U.S. federal agencies, 
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Haitian government agencies, Non-Governmental organizations, Community-
based organizations, University hospitals.  
4) Research Questions: The results helped answer the research questions and guide 
future recommendations and strong perspective for the development of a national 
response plan in Haiti. 
5) Cultural Competency: Knowing the context, the culture and because the 
researcher is a Haiti native leaving in Haiti at the time of the disaster, she was well 
equipped to lead the interviews and was able to quickly understand and facilitate 
the conversation flow. But the fact that she also experienced the disaster personally, 
her knowledge could also potentially be viewed as a bias. 
 
Dissemination of Information:  
The findings will be reported in aggregate format and then disseminated through 
summary reports, abstracts and educational materials to the national, regional and local 
agencies in Haiti, including governmental entities, private local and international NGOs, 
various institutions, community leaders and civil society representatives. The reported 
findings will highlight positive communication experiences and challenges that can be 
addressed in the short term, mid-term and long term.  The expectations are that the study 
results might be used to educate relevant agencies on communication factors that might 
have impacted the disaster response in 2010, help them strengthen their crisis 
communication protocols and reinforce their partnership strategies during disaster response 
and recovery situations. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
If the analysis by some authors demonstrated enlightening facts on humanitarian 
assistance strategies that were implemented by international agencies in Haiti after the 
earthquake, the results of this study not only outline the mishaps by world experts at the 
planning level.  A certain discomfort among the international agencies, between local and 
international agencies has also been identified in this study. The weaknesses in 
governmental institutions dedicated to design and implement the risk and disaster 
management plan have also been outline.  
Indeed, results obtained from interviews confirmed that the challenges were 
experienced at several levels and during various phases of the response.  
This study provides a more in-depth understanding of the disaster response context 
by comparing the similarities and differences between the communication approaches.  The 
results show that local and international relief agencies had used different communication 
plans and structures within and among agencies. In regards to the national response plan 
research and according to the data gathered, it is apparent that if this plan had existed it 
was not well disseminated. Based on the respondents’ interview, the findings of this study 
also suggest that the Haitian government did not have the ability to absorb the resources 
that were quickly deployed in the country in a very limited time.  
Several elements identified at local and international level may have contributed to 
weakening the general response: 
First, At the local level, as reported by several assessment reports published prior 
to the 2010 earthquake, the stormy past of the country, the weak public health 
infrastructure, the lack of local capacity and expertise and the weak government leadership, 
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the absence of prevention and mitigation of risks and disasters programs, lack of 
decentralization of responsibilities, are just among a few challenges related to the 
precarious situation of Haiti (USAID, 2011).  
Second, at the international level, based on the findings of this study, the lack of 
experience in emergency response, the eagerness to invest with directive, competition 
among agencies for visibility, lack of professionalism of certain groups of first responders, 
the presence of innumerable small organizations with non-essential programs and activities 
in Haiti, waste of resources, inadequate delivery of equipment and supplies, lack of cultural 
competences and linguistic capabilities can also explain the chaos reported by several 
respondents among others. These models of study show that there is significant room for 
improvement both at local and international level to better plan for future disasters. Long-
term investments should be designed based on evidence-based communication models and 
implemented according to local needs.  
The findings of the study give rise to subsequent questions that could lead to 
additional investigations such as; how many international organizations based in Haiti had 
an internal communication plan? Do agencies’ have a risk communication plan for their 
employees given that the country has been and is consistently at risk for an earthquake? 
How many local agencies in the civil society or how many governmental institutions made 
a plea for a national budget specifically allocated for disaster prevention? How many 
trainings has been conducted in schools, hospitals, public health offices to anticipate an 
earthquake occurrence?  
The limitations in communication that were reported and experienced are and 
remain a major part of the challenge confronting disasters in Haiti. Significant efforts 
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remain to be accomplished before Haiti reaches the desired level in terms of development 
and implementation of communication plans, and efficient coordination for the country.  
The disaster of 2010 by taking away the lives of more than 250,000 Haitian and changing 
the lives of hundreds of thousands of others, should not remain a mere historical tragedy 
in the history of mankind but should become an opportunity to draw lessons and create 
models for other countries to better prepared and cope with future disasters. The magnitude 
of this earthquake could probably cause as much distress even in a developed country with 
more resources and trained personnel. 
The results of this study provide sufficient evidence to confirm certain 
communication challenges even at the highest levels of the governance chain. Also, the 
longitudinal risk and disaster management model that exists in Haiti is a less flexible and 
autonomous system to respond to a complex disaster as compared the U.S. circular model 
that provided more leadership and authority to the regional and local level. Distinct and 
clear roles and responsibilities of the Haitian government and local NGO representatives 
should be clearly established and tested in preparation of a disaster and last but not least, 
the involvement of communities is imperative to promote resilience capabilities at the 
community level.    
 
Further recommended studies:   
For future research on this topic, and to reinforce the findings of this study, it would 
be recommended to include subjects and participants from additional countries besides the 
United States, as international agencies involved in the emergency response effort in Haiti 
in 2010 came from over 40 different countries (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010). In 
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addition, the results of a qualitative research design coupled with a quantitative 
methodology with additional variables to a larger population would greatly reinforce the 
findings and would provide a well-rounded collection of information needed for 
subsequent analyses. Also, a mixed method would support subsequent analyses and the 
case for a more in-depth investigation. Exploration of other regions of Haiti would also 
help understand how disaster relief efforts were deployed and experienced as almost  
500 000 people fled the capital to relocate in other cities specifically the Artibonite/Central 
Plateau region and in the North in the aftermath of the earthquake for which humanitarian 
assistance and resettlement infrastructures were also needed (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 
2010) 
Finally, coding and themes formulation can be burdensome for the researcher 
therefore having additional capacity to review the coding process would help reduce bias 
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Appendix A: Invitation Letter to Participate in Interview 
Dear Sir/ Madame, 
International and local government and non-governmental agencies have played a 
tremendous role in working with the Haitian community in response to 2010 disaster in 
Haiti. We are contacting you because we believe that your expertise and knowledge about 
the role played by several agencies in response to the 2010 disaster response can continue 
to support the recovery phase that is on-going in Haiti. In a continued effort to understand 
the communication challenges your agency had experienced during the response phase and 
to further reinforced communication protocols and strategies among agencies in the future, 
we will need your help to complete a short interview.  Your expert opinions and perceptions 
are the only elements required to answer the interview. It should not take longer than 30 
minutes to complete. Potential benefits of this interview are to highlight government 
agencies and NGO’s contributions with regard to emergency response in Haiti and to 
understand what could have been done to enhance the communication methods during 
disasters in Haiti or in other regions. The goals of this study are to identify communication 
experiences of first responders while deployed in a developing country and to provide to 
the Haiti government and stakeholders with a list of recommendations and tools that will 
help them improve multiagency coordination response effort in the future. Information 
provided during the interview will remain confidential, no individual identifiers will be 
kept or used for data presentation. We are also happy to provide more information via email 
or phone as needed. Thanks in advance for your consideration and response. For any 
question please contact me: Barbara.roussel@unmc.edu. Best Regards, 
 
  
Appendix B: Interview Questions and Guide 
The interview guide includes five domains and five sections, eight questions and 
eight probes. It will take approximately 30 minutes to complete an interview.   
 
  





Can you explain how 
important was your 
contribution in Haiti 
in 2010 as a first 
responder?   
 
How would you 
describe your 
communication 
experience as a first 
responder during the 
disaster response in 
Haiti? 
 
How different or 
similar was your 
experience in the 
Haitian context as 
compared to your 
previous experience?  
 
How easy of difficult 
was it for you to 
communicate with 












on the disaster 
response in Haiti, 
what national 
communication plan 
was proposed by the 
Haitian government 
to share information 
with relief 
organizations?  
if yes, can you briefly 




















by your relief 
organization during 
the 2010 disaster 




Were you aware of 
communication 
procedure different 
than your agency 
that was adopted by 










method you describe 
a newly developed 









effective one?  
 
 
If yes, how effective 







Can you briefly 
explain the level of 








Would you consider 
the language a 






   What are your 




mission in Haiti?  
 





strategies for an 
effective information 
sharing in Haiti in 
case of another 
disaster? 
 
How do you think 
your agency will use 
their communication 
experiences in Haiti 
to reinforce their 
communication 
strategies /protocols 






Can you please 
specify other factors, 
if existed, that you 
feel were obstacles 
to your organization 
in achieving its 
objectives during the 
disaster response in 
Haiti? 
 
What would you do 
differently in term of 
communication if 
you had to go back 















Appendix C: Translated English/French Questionnaire 
E: Can you explain how important was your contribution in Haiti in 2010 as a first 
responder?  
F : Pouvez-vous expliquer l’importance de votre contribution en Haïti en 2010 comme 
agent humanitaire ? 
E: How would you describe your communication experience as a first responder during the 
disaster response in Haiti? 
F : Comme pourriez-vous décrire votre expérience de communication comme agent 
humanitaire pendant la réponse post-séisme en Haïti ? 
 E: While collaborating on the disaster response in Haiti, what national communication 
plan was proposed by the Haitian government to share information with relief 
organizations? 
F : Durand votre collaboration en Haïti pour la période post-séisme, quel plan de 
communication national que le gouvernement Haïtien avait proposé pour partager avec les 
agences humanitaires ?  
E: Can you elaborate on the preferred method of communication used by your relief 
organization to share information with other agencies during the 2010 post-disaster 
response in Haiti?  
F: Pouvez-vous élaborer sur la méthode de communication optée et préférée par votre 
organisation pour partager des information avec d’autres agences pendant la réponse post-
séisme en Haïti ?    
 
  
E: Were you aware of communication procedure different than your agency that was 
adopted by other local or international organizations to share information while 
collaborating with stakeholders in Haiti? 
F: Etiez-vous au courant de procédures de communication autres que celles utilisées par 
votre organisation que d’autres agences nationales ou internationales utilisaient pour 
partager des informations avec les concernes en Haïti ? 
E: Can you briefly explain the level of difficulty or facility your agency experienced to 
communicate decisions with Haitian counterparts? 
F: Pouvez-vous brièvement expliquer le niveau de difficulté ou de facilite que votre 
organisation a expérimenté pour communiquer les décisions avec les partenaires Haïtiens ? 
E: What are your lessons learned from your communication experience during your 
humanitarian mission in Haiti? 
F: Quelles sont les leçons apprises de votre expérience en communication pendant votre 
mission humanitaire en Haïti ?  
E: What would be your recommendations to improve the communication protocols and 
strategies for an effective information sharing in Haiti in case of another disaster? 
F : Quelles seraient vos recommandations pour renforcer les protocoles et stratégies de 
communication pour une transmission d’information effective en Haïti dans le cas 
imminent de désastre ?  
E: Can you please specify other factors, if existed, that you feel were obstacles to your 
organization in achieving its objectives during the disaster response in Haiti? 
 
  
F: Pouvez-vous s’il vous plait spécifier d’autres facteurs, si existant, que vous estimez a 
causer obstacle à votre organisation dans l’aboutissement des objectifs fixes pendant la 
réponse post-séisme en Haïti ? 
E: What would you do differently in term of communication if you had to go back and 
work in this context again? 
F : Qu’est-ce que vous auriez fait différemment du point de vue communication si vous 














Appendix D: Information /Consent Form 
 
IRB PROTOCOL # 053-16-EX  
Title of Research Study: 
Exploring Emergency Communication Experiences in Response to the 2010 Haiti 
Earthquake: Lessons Learned from International Donors and Local Government 
Agencies 
You are invited to take part in this research study. The information in this form is meant 
to help you decide whether or not to take part. If you have any questions, please ask. 
You were selected as a potential participant in this study because you have been involved 
in the 2010 earthquake response and recovery stages in Haiti, therefore we would 
appreciate your assistance to conduct a phone interview in order to share your 
communication experiences during the disaster response in the 2010 Haiti earthquake.  
International, local government and non-governmental agencies have played a 
tremendous role in working with the Haitian community in response to 2010 disaster in 
Haiti. In any disaster setting, strong communication and coordination plans among 
humanitarian agencies are critical to guaranty the success of the response.  
In a continued effort to reinforce the multi-agency disaster response approach, this study 
aims to identify communication experiences of local and international first responders 
who worked in Haiti to assist with the post-earthquake response, and to provide to the 
Haitian’s government and other stakeholders with a list of recommendations and tools 
that will help improve the multiagency coordination response effort in the future.  
This research will help collect the relevant information needed to understand what were 
the communications strengths and challenges identified by first responders and 
emergency managers in Haiti and to understand how their experiences may have 
impacted the recovery work in Haiti and how we may work to improve the 
communication protocols in the future. 
Upon your agreement to collaborate in this research project, you will be invited to 
participate in a phone interview to respond to eight open-ended questions. The call should 
not take more than 30 min. The call will be recorded for verification purposes and to help 
validate the information that you will be providing 
 
  
There are no known risks to you from being in this research study. 
You are not expected to get any benefit from being in this research study. 
 
The Benefits of this study are several: 
1) Recommendations may be made based on study results and will be shared with Haitian 
governmental agencies and U.S. based organizations to help them either strengthen their 
communication protocols and strategies in case of a disaster; 
2) Educational materials may be proposed based on finding to help improve crisis 
communication plans in Haiti, 
3) Publication of results may be made with other Haitian and U.S. researchers in order to 
contribute by further researches in risk communication, disaster communication and 
communication protocols among relief agencies, 
4) Recommendations may be made to use study findings to revamp National Response 
Plan in Haiti. 
If you do not wish to participate, you can simply decline the invitation to participate in 
the interview via email. Instead of being in this research study you can choose not to 
participate. 
There is no cost to you to be in this research study and you will not be paid to be in this 
research study. 
Your welfare is the major concern of every member of the research team. If you have a 
problem as a direct result of being in this study, you should immediately contact one of 
the people listed at the end of this consent form. 
Reasonable steps will be taken to protect your privacy and the confidentiality of your 
study data. 
The only persons who will have access to your research records are the study personnel, 
the Institutional Review Board (IRB), and any other person or agency required by law.  
The information from this study may be published in scientific journals or presented at 
scientific meetings but your identity will be kept strictly confidential. 
You have rights as a research subject. These rights have been explained in this consent 
form and in The Rights of Research Subjects that you have been given.  If you have any 
questions concerning your rights or complaints about the research, talk to the investigator 
or contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) by: 
Telephone (402) 559-6463. 
Email: IRBORA@unmc.edu 





You can decide not to be in this research study, or you can stop being in this research 
study (“withdraw”) at any time before, during, or after the research begins.   
Deciding not to be in this research study or deciding to withdraw will not affect your 
relationship with the investigator, or with the University of Nebraska Medical Center. 
If the research team gets any new information during this research study that may affect 
whether you would want to continue being in the study you will be informed promptly. 
You are freely making a decision whether to be in this research study. Signing this form 
means that (1) you have read and understood this consent form, (2) you have had the 
consent form explained to you, (3) you have had your questions answered and (4) you 
have decided to be in the research study. 
 
If you have any questions during the study, you should talk to one of the investigators 
listed below.  You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep. 
 
Name of Subject:                          Date:  Time:  
My signature certifies that all the elements of informed consent described on this consent 
form have been explained fully to the subject.  In my judgment, the participant possesses 
the legal capacity to give informed consent to participate in this research and is 
voluntarily and knowingly giving informed consent to participate.  
 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent:    Date:  
 
Authorized Study Personnel: 
Principal Investigator : Barbara Roussel / Barbara.roussel@unm.edu  






Appendix E: IRB approved letter 
Barbara Roussel, MsC 
COPH Hlth Pr, Soc & Behv Health 
UNMC - 4320 
IRB # 053-16-EX 
TITLE OF PROPOSAL: Exploring emergency communication experiences in response 
to the 2010 Haiti earthquake: Lessons learned from international donors and local 
government agencies 
The Office of Regulatory Affairs (ORA) has reviewed your application for Exempt 
Educational, Behavioral, and Social Science Research on the above-titled research 
project. According to the information provided, this project is exempt under 45 CFR 
46:101b, category 2. You are therefore authorized to begin the research.  
It is understood this project will be conducted in full accordance with all applicable 
HRPP Policies. It is also understood that the ORA will be immediately notified of any 
proposed changes for your research project. 
Please be advised that this research has a maximum approval period of 5 years from the 
original date of approval and release. If this study continues beyond the five year 
approval period, the project must be resubmitted in order to maintain an active approval 
status. 
Sincerely, 
Signed on: 2016-02-22 13:09:00.000 
Gail Kotulak, BS, CIP 
IRB Administrator III 
Office of Regulatory Affairs 
 
 
